📩 Paid partnership with the Kremlin?

DEAR READER, 

You might have seen a meme recently going around on X/Twitter that features a figure declaring, “I am an independent thinker who doesn’t trust what the government and mainstream media say,” while consuming content labeled as “literal Russian propaganda.” Initially, X/Twitter might have been a somewhat reliable source for news about the war in Ukraine. However, since Elon Musk took over, there has been a shift towards disinformation under the guise of free speech.

So, how did Elon Musk transition from supporting Ukraine with Starlink to promoting Kremlin talking points on his platform? Eliot Higgins from Bellingcat offers an explanation: Musk sources his news from alternative outlets that inherently oppose mainstream media. This distrust fosters echo chambers and radicalizes readers – something often exploited by the Russians. Particularly after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, numerous campaigns have emerged advocating for ceding Ukrainian territory for peace, driven by "pacifist activists" who call for “stopping the hostilities.” Even Donald Trump avoided answering questions about Ukraine during last week’s presidential debate, instead stating he “just want(s) to stop the war.” This approach shifts the blame onto the victim and aligns with the Russian propaganda playbook. To learn more about Russian cognitive warfare against the West, read our article detailing Russia's exploitations of social media campaigns.

With social media propaganda on the rise, this week’s expert opinion is inspired by the recent scandal involving TENET Media and its Russian backers. We asked Givi Gigitashvili, an open-source analyst and Research Associate at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab, to examine the broader implications of Russia using internet personalities to influence elections not only in the United States, but also in Eastern Europe, where countries face even more complex propaganda efforts.

Enjoy reading this “brief”!

On September 5th, the US Justice Department charged two RT employees with money laundering and conducting malign influence against the United States, alleging they hired an American company to influence the 2024 US presidential election. RT employees reportedly paid nearly $10 million to online commentators to spread pro-Russia propaganda and to advance Russia’s interest in the US. Additionally, the Justice Department seized several fake news sites that mimicked reputable outlets like Fox News and the Washington Post. Fake websites were used to push Russian government narratives aimed at reducing international support for Ukraine and promoting pro-Russian policies.

This case highlights a shift in Russia’s election interference tactics compared to the 2016 elections. Instead of relying on fake social media accounts, Russia has co-opted real American influencers with significant audiences, exploiting their established credibility. This strategy is more effective because it uses the trust these influencers have with their organic audiences. The US authorities noted that Russian companies are tracking around 2,800 influencers globally to convince them spreading pro-Kremlin messages, indicating potential efforts to manipulate influential figures in Eastern Europe as well.

The incident has sparked discussions about the transparency of payments influencers receive for publishing political content. As creator-driven media grows in influence, the lack of transparency regarding funding poses a significant threat to election integrity and the media landscape. In view of this, an important lesson for other countries including those in Eastern Europe, is the significance of influencers disclosing who funds their political messages.

RT has also adapted its tactics in Eastern Europe. The US State Department noted that that editor in chief of RT, Margarita Simonyan, has directly collaborated with the Kremlin to assist the Russian government's efforts to sway the October 2024 Moldovan election and to foment unrest in the country. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, RT has restructured its operations to circumvent restrictions, using more covert methods. In March 2024 the Alliance for Securing Democracy revealed that a network of Polish news blogs reposts content from RT to reach Polish audience, identifying around 400 domains, including some in the EU, that republish RT-originated articles. 

Furthermore, fake websites seized by US authorities were operated by Doppelgänger, described by Meta as the “most aggressively persistent” Russian-backed malicious network. Doppelgänger has previously targeted countries like Ukraine, Georgia, and Poland, and it aimed to influence the 2024 European Parliamentary elections by impersonating trusted European media outlets. This poses immediate risks for upcoming elections in Georgia and Moldova, where similar tactics may be used to sway public opinion.

Thus, the key takeaway for Eastern European countries from the US response to Russia’s election interference is the necessity of a multifaceted approach to counter such threats. The US government’s strategy involved comprehensive indictments using various legal tools from the department of justice, treasury department, state department, and the FBI. This approach emphasizes that exposure alone is not enough; a broad range of punitive actions is required to effectively counter malign influence as a national security threat.